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TOWARD MAXIMUM FACILITATION OF
INTENT TO CREATE ENFORCEABLE
ARTICLE NINE SECURITY INTERESTS
HAROLD R. WEINBERG*
Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code generally facili-
tates individual autonomy in the creation of consensual security in-
terests by imposing limited form and content requirements on security
agreements.' Private autonomy is subordinated, however, where the
Article's draftsmen believed that certain other policies required a de-
gree of regulation.' Through the process of interpreting and applying
a number of Code provisions which set forth the requirements for
creating security interests,3 a court can effectuate what it considers to
be the appropriate balance between facilitating the parties' intent to
create a security interest and insuring that regulatory policies, such as
protecting creditors and debtors from fraud and mistake, are en-
forced. A court may also effectuate its view of the appropriate balance
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; A.B., 1966 Western Re-
serve University; J.D., 1969 Case Western Reserve University; LL.M., 1975 University
of Illinois,
' The approach of the Code generally is one of facilitation rather than regula-
tion. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE § 1-102(3) (1972 version) & Comment 2
[hereinafter cited as UGC]. (Material differences between the 1972 Official Text and
Uniform Commercial Code (1962 version) will be noted.) See generally Murphy,
Facilitation and Regulation in the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 NOIRE DANE LAWYER 625,
626-28 (1966); Bunn, Freedom of Contract under the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 B.C. IND.
& COM. L. REv. 59 (1960).
2 Article Nine was designed to set out "a comprehensive scheme for the regula-
tion of security interests in personal property and fixtures." UCC § 9-101, Comment.
While the Article facilitates autonomy in the creation of security interests, it is highly
regulatory in some other respects. For example, to perfect a security interest by filing, it
is necessary to comply carefully with the Article's place of filing requirements. See UCC
§ 9-401. The Article also expressly recognizes that noncompliance with extra UCC reg-
ulatory statutes, such as the usury laws, might invalidate otherwise valid security agree-
ments. UCC §§ 9-201, 9-203(4).
" An example of such a provision is UCC § 9-203(I)(a), which conditions en-
forceability of a nonpossessory security interest by requiring that it he evidenced by a
security agreement, signed by die debtor, which contains a description of the collateral.
See also UCC §§ 9.105(1)(/), 9-110. See text at notes 7-10 infra.
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through the manner in which it treats evidence which is offered by a
litigant to demonstrate the parties' intent to create a security interest
and to interpret the provisions of an alleged security agreement.
In the first section of this article it will be demonstrated that
some courts have overregulated nonpossessory security agreements
both through their interpretation of Article Nine and through their
treatment of evidence of intent. The second part of this article will
demonstrate that such overregulation is required neither to insure
compliance with the language of Article Nine nor to achieve the gen-
eral purposes of the Article Nine statute of frauds." This dem-
onstration will reveal that both the provisions of Article Nine regulat-
ing the creation of nonpossessory security interests as well as the rules
governing the interpretation of contracts should be construed and
applied in such a manner as to permit maximum facilitation of private
autonomy in the creation of security interests.
I. AN OVERREGULATION EXEMPLAR
A. Overregulation Through Interpretation of Article Nine
The basic rule under Article Nine is one of validation for pri-
vately agreed terms: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a se-
curity agreement is effective according to its terms between the par-
ties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors." 5 The
draftsmen thus intended to allow individual secured parties and
debtors to create customized security agreements. 6 Three of Article
Nine's provisions, however, provide a framework for the creation of
an enforceable security interest which places some limits on this basic
rule. The central provision which limits individual autonomy in the
creation of Article Nine security interests is section 9-203(1)(a). This
section provides that:
[A] security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or
third parties with respect to the collateral and does not at-
tach unless ... the collateral is in the possession of the se-
cured party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed
a security agreement which contains a description of the collat-
eral. . . 7
UCC § 9-203(1)(a).
5 UCC § 9-201. UCC § 9-101. Comment states: "The rules set out in this Article
are principally concerned with the limits of the secured party's protection against pur-
chasers from and creditors of the debtor." "Term" is defined as "that portion of an
agreement which relates to a particular matter." UCC § 1-201(42).
6 Persons are not free, however, to decide whether Article Nine will apply to
their transaction. If the transaction is intended to create a security interest in personal
property, the Article applies. UCC § 9-102(l)(a). The intent of the parties may be of lit-
tle importance in determining the applicability of Article Nine to certain transactions.
See I G. GitAtokE. SECURITY 1NTEREsTs IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.2, at 338 (1965).
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE]. See note 88 infra.
7 UCCI 9-203(1)(a) (emphasis added). This section incorporates both the re-
2
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The second limit to the basic rule is found in section 9-105(1)(1)
which defines a security agreement as "an agreement which creates or
provides for a security interest." This provision is expanded by the
general definition of agreement in Article One as "the bargain of the
parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other
circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course
of performance ...." 9 Section 9-110, the third Article Nine provision
which limits private autonomy in the creation of security interests,
states that "any description of personal property or real estate is suffi-
cient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is
described."" A number of courts have construed these provisions to
demand a high degree of formalism and specificity for nonpossessory
security agreements." A sampling of these cases provides a basis from
which to strike a more appropriate balance between facilitation and
regulation of privately created security interests.
1. Granting Clause Requirement Cases
The question of whether a particular signed writing sufficiently
evidences an agreement which "creates or provides for a security
interest"" has been a frequent source of litigation under Article Nine.
The cases addressing this issue have involved the sufficiency of prom-
issory notes, financing statements, corporate resolutions, and other
writings which do not contain typical security agreement language. A
substantial number of these cases, beginning with the 1963 decision of
quirement that there be a written security agreement, signed by the debtor, which con-
tains a description of the collateral and the requirement that there be "agreement" that
the security interest attach. The latter requirement was stated separately in UCC §
9-204 (1962 version). The 1972 amendment was intended to cure the anomaly in the
1962 Official Text that a security interest could attach and he perfected but be unen-
forceable for lack of a written security agreement signed by the debtor. UCC §§ 9-204,
9-303 (1962 Version). See PERMANENT EDETORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL.
CODE, FINAL REPORT 61-62 (1971).
The Code contains two exceptions to these general requirements for an enforce-
able security interest. No writing or signed security agreement is necessary to have an
enforceable security interest arising under Article Two on sales so long as the debtor
does not obtain lawful possession of the goods. UCC § 9-113. Such interests are non-
consensual, so a writing and security agreement are not required. Since the secured
party or his bailee would normally he in possession of the collateral, a filing is not
necessary. Id., Comment 2. See generally Hogan, The Marriage of Sales to Chattel Security in
the Uniform Commercial Code: Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U. L. REv. 571 (1958). Collecting
banks can have an enforceable, nonconsensual security interest in items in their posses-
sion without compliance with the Article Nine formalities. UCC § 4-208.
8 UCC § 9-105(1)(1). UCC § 1-203(37) defines "security interest" as "an interest in
personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
" UCC § 1-201(3). See UCC § 9-105(4).
UCC § 9-110. There are several nonuniform versions of this section. See note
31 infra.
" E.g., In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co., 503 F.2d 1133 (3d Cir. 1974);
Shelton v. Erwin, 472 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1973); American Card Co. v. H.M.H. Co., 97
R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963). See text at notes 12-49 infra.
" UCC § 9-105(1)(1).
3
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the Rhode Island Supreme Court in American Card Co. v. H.M.H.
Co.,' 3 have concluded that a writing must contain a grant or con-
veyance of a security interest to constitute a security agreement even
when the intent to create a security interest is certain." A more recent
example of the reasoning employed in cases such as American Card can
be found in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Shelton v. Erwin. 15
In Shelton, the buyer purchased an automobile and executed a
bill of sale which described the automobile, set out the terms of pay-
ment, and placed him under a duty to insure the automobile until
payment was completed. The buyer also filed an application for a
Missouri title showing himself as owner and the seller as lien holder.
The certificate of title which was issued shortly thereafter also indi-
cated this relationship. Subsequently, the buyer went bankrupt and
the trustee in bankruptcy filed petitions against both the buyer and
seller seeking title to and possession of the automobile. The district
court, reversing the decision of the referee in bankruptcy, held that
the bill of sale and title application satisfied the "modest" UCC re-
quirements for a written security agreement.'" The court of appeals,
while agreeing with the district court that "the parties clearly intended
to create a security interest,"" nevertheless held that the buyer and
seller had not succeeded in creating such an interest since neither the
bill of sale nor the title application was a "security agreement" within
the Article Nine definition of that term.'"
For a nonpossessory security interest to be enforceable, there
must be a "security agreement," 1 " which, under section 9-105(1)(/), is
an agreement that "creates or provides for a security interest." The
Eighth Circuit noted, however, that no explicit mention of a security
interest was made in the bill of sale. 2 ° Furthermore, while the court
recognized that "no precise words are required by the Code," it main-
tained that the language of section 9-105(1)(/) effectively requires
some language in the agreement "actually conveying" a security
interest. 2 ' In the absence of such language, the agreement was unen-
forceable even though this result defeated the clear intent of the
parties. 22
 The court justified its strict interpretation of Section
13 97 R.I. 59, 63, 196 A.2d 150, 152 (1963).
"See cases cited in notes 15 & 23 infra.
19 472 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1973).
"In re Shelton, 343 F. Supp. 43, 44 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
17 472 F.2d at 1119.
"Id. at 1120.
19 UCC § 9-203(1)(a).
" 472 F.2d at 1120.
21 Id.
"id, The seller could not claim an equitable lien because Article Nine, by reduc-
ing the formal requirements needed to establish a security interest, was designed to
abolish the doctrine for transactions within the scope of the Article. See id; I GI MORE.
supra note 6, § 11.4, at 345-46. But see General Ins. Co. v. Lowery, 412 F. Supp. 12 (S.
4
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9-105(1)(/) by stating that since the Code's requirements for the crea-
tion of an enforceable security interest are "not ambiguous," there is
no reason to relax those requirements. 25
2. Inadequate Description Cases
Courts have also thwarted the intent of parties to create nonpos-
sessory security agreements by focusing on the requirement imposed
by sections 9-203(1)(a) and 9-110 that the agreement contain a
reasonable description of the collateral. A recent example of a case in
which a court found the temporal boundaries of the collateral insuffi-
ciently described is In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co. Z 4 There the
debtor had executed a security agreement which granted the secured
party a security interest in "all Receivables and the proceeds thereof
as security for the Liabilities."25 The agreement defined receivables as
"all of Debtor's Accounts Receivable" and liabilities as "any and all
indebtedness of Debtor to Secured Party of every kind and descrip-
tion, now existing or hereafter arising."" The issue before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was whether the phrase
all accounts receivable" was sufficient For purposes of Section 9-110
to "reasonably" identify aftet-acquired accounts as part of the de-
scribed collateral."
The Third Circuit initially noted the lower court's finding that
the debtor and secured party had intended to create a security in-
terest in after-acquired accounts. With the recognition that floating
liens on accounts receivable were widely used in current commercial
practice, the reviewing court then concluded that there was a rational
basis for the premise that "many" ,prospective lenders who read the
security agreement "would be alerted that the parties may well have
intended to include after-acquired accounts" in the collateral." The
Third Circuit decided, however, that the description was insufficient
D, Ohio 1976); Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 11 Mich. App. 274, 161 N.W.2d 133
(1968).
"Accord, e.g., Mosley v. Dallas Entertainment Co., 496 S.W.2d 237, 290 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973) (financing statement cannot serve as a security agreement if it does not
contain granting language); White v. Household Finance Corp., 302 N,E.2d 828,
836-37 (Ind. App. 1973) (application for certificate of title showing lien in favor of
creditor insufficient to create a security interest). But see, e.g., Peterson v. Ziegler, — Ill.
App. 3d—, 350 N,E.2d 356 (1976) (application for certificate of title for a house trailer
indicating the existence of a lien creates a security interest; Kreiger v. Harlig, II Wash.
App. 898, 900, 527 P.2d 483, 485 (1974) (application fin- certificate of automobile own-
ership noting secured party's security interest creates or provides for a security in-
terest). See generally 1 Gii.monE,supra note 6, § 11.4, at 347-48.
" 503 F.2d 1133 (3d. Cir. 1974), noted in 48 TEmP. L. Q. 833 (1975).
3 5 503 F.2d at 1134.
36 Id.
" Id. at 1135. Under UCC § 9-204(1), a security agreement may provide that any
or all obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired
collateral.
Ye Id. at 1135-36.
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to meet the requirement of section 9-110 because an express reference
to after-acquired property was necessary to protect those few prospec-
tive lenders who might possibly be misled by the parties' description.
The court reasoned that such a reference could easily have been in-
corporated into the security agreement." Thus, acting largely in the
belief that strict standards for collateral descriptions were required in
order to protect third parties, the Third Circuit in Middle Atlantic
exhibited a regulatory attitude toward the adequacy of descriptions of
collateral in security agreements."
In re Laminated Veneers Co." is an example of a case in which a
court found the physical characteristics of the collateral insufficiently
described. There, the security agreement, which explicitly granted a
security interest in specific items, including a truck, contained an om-
nibus clause which broadly granted a security interest in certain types
of goods including "equipment."32 The issue in the case was whether
" Id. at 1136. But see id. at 1137-38 (Seitz, C.J. dissenting). It should be em-
phasized that the court's decision was based on UCC § 9-110, which requires a reasona-
ble description of the collateral, and not on UCC § 9-204(1), which validates after-
acquired property clauses. For a case that reflects the notion that UCC § 9-204(1) re-
quires an express reference to after-acquired collateral, see In re Taylored Products,
Inc. 5 UCC REP. SERV 286, 289-91 (W.D. Mich. 1968). Based upon this view, UCC §
9-204(1) creates an additional statutory formality. This writer believes this to be incor-
rect. UCC § 9-204(1) has as its purpose the validation of after-acquired property
clauses. "Formal Requisites" are provided in UCC § 9-203(1), which is the exclusive
source for such requirements for security agreements. See UCC § 9-203, Comment I.
Moreover, UCC § 9-204(1) states that a "security agreement" may provide for after-
acquired property, not that a "writing" or "written security agreement" may so provide.
Thus, if a written after-acquired property clause is required, it must he through the
general requirement of a written security agreement which contains a description of the
collateral.
3° Accord, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1969) (se-
curity interest in after-acquired property not found where agreement stated: "Assignor
desires to assign to assignee accounts receivable which ... will become due ...."). But
see, e.g., In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 452 F.2d 56, 56-57 (8th Cir. 1971) (security
interest in after-acquired property found where agreement stated: "All ... merchandise
inventory held for resale"); In re Page, 16 UCC Rdr. SERV. 501, 504 (M.D. Fla. 1974)
(security interest in after-acquired property found where agreement stated: "fAill the
inventory and equipment located at 8002 North Armenia"). See generally Skilton, Security
Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Ms. L. REV.
925, 932-37; Recent Cases, 48 Tiimr. L. Q. 833, 835 (1975).
31 471 F.2d 1 124 (2d Cir. 1973), noted in Recent Cases, 39 Mo. L. REV. 75 (1974):
Comment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 365 (1973), New York has a nonuniform version of UCC §
9-110, but this would appear to have no effect on the precedential value of this case in
jurisdictions which have enacted the Uniform version of UCC § 9-110 because the New
York version differs only with respect to real estate. For the Uniform version, see the
text at note 10 supra. The New York version provides that: "For the purpose of this Ar-
ticle any description of personal property or, except as otherwise required by subsection
2 of Section 9-402 relating to the content of a financing statement, real estate is suffi-
cient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described." N.Y.
UCC § 9-110 (McKinney 1964). A similar, more recent, Second Circuit case, but with a
holding favorable to the secured party, is In re Sarex Corp., 509 F.2d 689, 690.93 (2d
Cir. 1975).
32 971 F.2d at 1125. The omnibus clause read in part:
In addition to all the above enumerated items, it is the intention that this
6
ARTICLE NINE SECURITY INTERESTS
the secured party had an enforceable security interest in two
automobiles. 33 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld the bankruptcy trustee's contention that an examining
creditor would conclude that, since the truck was the only vehicle
specifically mentioned in the security agreement, it was the only one
intended to be covered. 34 Although the generic description "equip-
ment" used in the agreement was correct for classifying the cars
under the Article Nine scheme for the classification of collateral, the
purpose of this scheme was viewed .by the court as one of determining
the applicable set of filing requirements rather than of providing a set
of statutorily approved descriptions of collateral for security agree-
ments. Consequently, while "equipMent" might be a sufficient descrip-
tion for a financing statement, it was an insufficient description for a
security agreement." As a result, in Laminated Veneers, the Second
Circuit felt constrained to hold that the word "equipment" was not
sufficiently specific to reasonably identify the automobiles as part of
the collateral."
B. Overregulation Through Restrictive Interpretation of Security Agreement
Language—"Tunnel Vision" Cases
Cases such as those previously discussed are examples of the way
in which a court can actualize a regulatory bias through the interpre-
tation and application of the statutory formalities for the creation of
an enforceable security interest. An illustration of how a court can
also give effect to this bias through the interpretation of security
agreement language is to be found in Mitchell v. Shepherd Mall State
Bank. 37 There, Section D of the form security agreement contained
the heading "COLLATERAL" and subsection D.1 thereunder stated:
"The security interest is granted in the following collateral: Describe
mortgage shall cover all chattels, machinery, (and] equipment ... belong-
ing to the mortgagor ... now at the plant of Laminated Veneers Co., ...
and all chattels, machinery, fixtures, or equipment that may hereinafter be
brought in or installed in said premises or any new premises of the
mortgagor....
Id. at 1125 n.l.
33 id.
34
 Id. But see id. at 1125-28 (Lumbard, J. dissenting).
35 Id. at 1125. The courts have often been more sympathetic to broad security
agreement descriptions. See Burke, Secured Transactions, 30 Bus. LAW. 893, 900 (1975).
Concerning the use of generic descriptions in financing statements, see notes and text
at notes 127-29 infra.
34 The dissenting judge found that a security interest in the autos, along with
most of the other assets owned by the debtor, had been established and that the de-
scription was adequate under the circumstances because a potential creditor considering
lending against the autos would, at least, be placed on notice to determine if the autos
were used as equipment by the debtor and were thus subject to a prior security interest.
471 F.2d at 1127.
" 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972).
7
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collateral."" In the space provided for the description appeared the
typed statement: "See EQUIPMENT LIST attached hereto and made
a part hereof, describing equipment, furniture and fixtures located at
[certain] ... stores." 39 A two-page list of equipment, furniture, and
fixtures was attached to the security agreement. Subsection D.2 of the
section on "COLLATERAL" directed the, parties to "[Olassify goods
under (one or more of) the following Uniform Commercial Code
categories," and contained five boxes labeled "Consumer Goods,"
"Equipment (business use)," "Inventory," "Accounts Receivable," and
"Contract Rights." 4 ° All of the boxes, except the first one, were
checked. Therefore, the collateral "described" (equipment, furniture
and fixtures) in subsection D.1 was not the same as the collateral
"classified" (equipment, inventory, accounts receivable and contract
rights) in subsection D.2. Financing statements covering all machinery,
equipment, fixtures, furniture, inventory, accounts receivable and
contract rights were properly filed. After the debtor filed for bank-
ruptcy the trustee contested the secured party's claim that the agree-
ment secured inventory, accounts receivable and contract rights.
The district court held that since the description of the collateral
in subsection D.1 was unambiguous, parol evidence to the effect that
the parties intended to include inventory, accounts receivable and
contract rights as collateral, should not have been received by the ref-
eree in bankruptcy." Furthermore, the court refused to find that
subsection D.2 extended the security interest to inventory, accounts
receivable and contract rights or that it even so clouded the intent of
the parties that it was necessary to resort to parol evidence for
clarification. 42 The court stated that under the UCC the purpose of a
classifications section such as subsection D.2 was to determine the
answers to questions such as where a financing statement must be
filed, and not to describe or to create a security interest. 43 Accord-
ingly, a third party, who tried to determine what property was se-
cured by this agreement, would be unlikely to regard subsection D.2
as determining the dimensions of the security interest." Thus, the
district court essentially decided that a third party should not be re-
quired to study and interpret all the provisions of a security agree-
ment at the peril of not learning the full extent of the security interest
it creates when an unambiguous provision, in this case subsection D.1,
35 Id. at 702.
" Id.
90 1d.
41 324 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (W.D, Olda. 1971).
' 2 /d. at 1032. In reaching its holding, the district court recognized that subsec-
tion 0.2 invited a misclassification because accounts receivable and contract rights can-
not be classified as goods under Article Nine. Id. The 1972 Official Text of the Code
has eliminated contract rights as a separate subclassification for intangible collateral. See
UCC § 9-106.
45 Id.
" Id. at 1033.
8
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is clearly designated in the agreement as containing a description of
the collateral.
The affirming opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, while acknowledging the district court's considera-
tions, focused on what it perceived to be a lack of language "creating
or providing for" a security interest in accounts, contract. rights and
inventory in the security agreement. The court reasoned that the lan-
guage in subsection D.I, that "[Me security interest is granted in the
following collateral,'" referred only to the items mentioned in the
space provided below subsection D.1, while subsection D.2 contained
no "granting" language of its own." In determining what extrinsic
evidence, if any, might be considered to illuminate the actual intent of
the immediate parties, the court held that, despite the unambiguous
reference to inventory, accounts receivable and contract rights in the
financing statements, these statements could have no bearing on the
case, since a financing statement cannot serve as a security agreement
absent explicit "granting" language. 47
 The court also agreed with the
district court that the uncontroverted testimony of the hank's vice
president, which was introduced in support of the secured party's
contentions, was inadmissable because the description of collateral in
subsection D.1 was unambiguous and, even if the form security
agreement was ambiguous, it should be construed against the secured
party draftsman."
The opinions in Mitchell demonstrate how restrictions on the
admissibility of clarifying extrinsic evidence can define the legal effect
of a security agreement in a manner which may be inconsistent with
the actual intention ,
 of the parties. 4 " This restrictive approach flowed
from an equally regulatory construction and application of the Article
Nine formalities.
II. TOWARD MAXIMUM FACILITATION OF THE INTENT OF THE
PARTIES TO A SECURITY AGREEMENT
As demonstrated by the cases in the preceding exemplar, courts
43
 458 F.2d at 702.
"Id. at 703.
"Id. at 703.04.
" Id. at 704,
"Accord, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Passport Fashion, Ltd., 67 Misc. 2d 3, 6.7,
322 N.Y.S.2d 765, 768-69 (Sup. Ct.), a/fd mem., 38 App. Div. 2d 690, 327 N.Y.S. 2d
356 (1971), appeal denied, 30 N.Y.2d 482, 280 N.E.2d 895, 330 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1972)
(extrinsic evidence not admissible to clarify security agreement in action involving third
parties). But see, e.g., Gni& v. Exchange Nall Bank, 308 So.2d 148, 150 (Fla, Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (extrinsic evidence admitted to clarify security agreement in action between
immediate parties); In re Amex-Protein Development. Corp., 504 F.2d 1056, 1060-62
(9th Cir. 1974) (extrinsic evidence admissible to clarify security agreement in an action
between secured party and bankruptcy trustee); In re Metzler, 405 F. Stipp, 622, 625
(N.D. Ala. 1975) (extrinsic evidence admissible to clarify security agreement in an action
between secured party and bankruptcy trustee). See notes and text at notes 175-79
infra.
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may marshall one or more arguments in support of a restrictive ap-
proach to the construction and application of Article Nine's
framework for the creation of an enforceable, nonpossessory security
interest and to the interpretation of security agreement language. The
justifications most commonly given for a restrictive approach are first,
that such an approach is required by the statutory language of Article
Nine; and second, that such an approach is required for the protec-
tion of third parties. The balance of this article is devoted to evaluat-
ing the merits of these and related arguments.
A. The Statutory Language of Article Nine
The question of whether an enforceable, nonpossessory security
interest has been created under the aforementioned Article Nine
statutory formalities can be broken down into two significant sub-
sidiary inquiries: 50
(1) Does the writing evidence a bargain of the immediate
parties in fact, as found in their language or by implication
from other circumstances including course of dealing or
usage of trade or course of performance," to create or
provide for a security interest? 52
•(2) Does the writing contain a description of the collateral
which reasonably identifies what is described?"
A proper response to these two inquiries can be reached and an ap-
propriate balance between facilitation and regulation can be struck
only if the origins, meaning, and policy underlying each requirement
is understood.
5 " A third, less significant, inquiry under Article Nine is whether there is a writ-
ing signed by the debtor. UCC § 9-203 (1)(a). The requirement that a nonpossessory
security agreement be evidenced by a signed writing was a typical requirement of the
pre-Code personal property security statutes enacted when such assignments took on
increased commercial importance, see generally I GILMORE, supra note 6, § 2.7, at 52, and
was incorporated into the earliest versions of the Code. See, e.g., UCC §§ 7-309, 7-405,
7-508, 7-611 & Comments (May 1949 Draft version). The draftsmen of the Code
adopted the policy of requiring a signed writing containing a description of the collat-
eral but they abandoned additional formal requirements such as acknowledgements and
affidavits. See, e.g., UCC §§ 7-309, 7-405, 7-508 & Comments (May 1949 Draft version).
Early drafts required greater formality for security interests in consumer goods. Id. at §
7-611. The requirement that the writing be signed can be met under the present ver-
sion of Article Nine by "any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present inten-
tion to authenticate a writing." UCC § 1-201(39). This requirement has not worked to
defeat the probable intent of the parties to a security agreement as often as the other
formalities have, Ina see, e.g., Food Service Equipment Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 121 Ga.
App. 421, 174 S.E. 2r1 216 (1970), and, therefore, will be given no further considera-
tion herein.
" See UCC §§ 9-203(1), 1-201(3).
53 UCC 9-105(1)(1).
53 See UCC §§ 9-110, 9-203 (1)(a).
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1. The Requirement that the Writing Create or Provide for a Security
Interest
Neither the statute nor its comments specify any mandatory
term which the security agreement must contain other than a descrip-
tion of the collateral. Although "security agreernent" is defined by sec-
tion 9-105(1)(1) as an agreement which "creates or provides for a se-
curity interest," this is a definitional provision only; it does not create
a requirement that the writing contain words of grant, creation, or
any other specified term." Presumably, if the draftsmen had intended
to require active words of creation, such a precise requirement would
have been separately expressed, or at least alluded to, in the language
of or comments to section 9-203 which is captioned "Attachment and
Enforceability of Security Interests; ... Formal Requisites." 55
Moreover, a requirement of such "magic words" would have been in-
consistent with the simplification in personal property security law
that the draftsmen were attempting to achieve."
The official comments to section 9-203 indicate that the
draftsmen of Article Nine, when requiring a writing that "creates or
provides" for a security interest, intended to require those types of
writings which could function qua statute of frauds to provide
minimum evidence of a possible security interest and a minimum
safeguard against fraudulent or mistaken claims of secured status. 57
One class of memoranda which should rise to the level of security
agreements under this test includes writings which, while not ex-
pressly granting a security interest, are on their face referable to or
descriptive of a possible security agreement, security interest, or se-
cured status. Writings of this type would include, for example, a prom-
issory note which contains a passive reference to a security
agreement; 55 a letter from the debtor acknowledging or referring to a
"See, e.g., Kreiger v. Hartig, 11 Wash. App. 898, 527 P.2d 483 (1974). But see,
e.g., Shelton v. Erwin, 472 F,2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1973), See text at notes 12-23 supra.
35 Section captions are made part of the UCC by § 1-109.
R" See text at notes 180-81 infra.
57 UCC § 9-203, Comments 3 and 5; see In re Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d 1328,
1331 (1st Cir. 1973). See generally 1 Gu.stoRE,supra note 6, § 11.4, at 347-48. Providing
these sorts of assurances is the basic purpose of Anglo-American statutes of frauds. See
generally Perin°, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form,
43 Fox0 L. REv, 39, 64-69 (1974) [hereinafter cited as . Perillo].
Under UCC § 9-203 both the debtor to an alleged security agreement and third
parties can assert that the agreement is not enforceable. UCC § 9-203(1). Under sonic
statutes of' frauds only the parties to an agreement and their privies can raise the de-
fense. S'ee 2 A. CoRIHN. ON CONTRACTS § 289, at 54 (1950) [hereinafter cited as CoRisit,].
" For example, a promissory note should be sufficient if it contains language
such as "This note is secured by a security agreement of even date herewith." See e.g.,
In re 'Amex-Protein Development Corp.„ 504 F.2d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1974); In re
Center Auto Parts, 6 UCC REI'. SERV. 398, 399 (C.D. Cal. 1968). But see, e.g., Safe De-
posit & Trust Bank Co. v. Berman, 393 F.2d 401, 403 (1st Cir. 1968); In re Penn Hous-
ing Corp., 367 F. Supp. 661, 662-63 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Barth Bros. v. Billings, 68 Wis.
2d 80, 88-90, 227 N.W.2d 673, 678 (1975).
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security interest; 59 an application for a certificate of title which refers
to the alleged secured party as a lien holder; 6° a corporate resolution
which ratifies or refers to a secured transaction or which authorizes
an officer of the debtor corporation to enter into a secured
transaction;" and a letter written by a debtor to his account clebtor62
requesting the account debtor to pay the debt to the alleged secured
party." 3
Many courts have determined that such writings rise to the level
of security agreements." For example, in In re Amex-Protein Develop-
ment Corp.," the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that a promissory note containing the words "[t]his note is se-
cured by a Security Interest in subject personal property as per in-
vokes" created or provided for a security interest. 66 The court
adopted the opinion of the district court which concluded that passive
language referring to a security interest, as well as active language
creating or granting a security interest, can "create or provide" for a
security interest. In reaching this conclusion, the court defined
"create" as a transitive verb meaning "to bring into existence" and
"provide" as an intransitive verb meaning "to make a proviso or
stipulation."'" Thus, the court concluded that UCC section 9-105(1)(1)
"may be satisfied not only when a security interest is caused to be or
brought into existence, but also when provision or stipulation is made
therefor." 6"
39 For example, a letter should be sufficient if it contained language such as
"Please find enclosed a copy of our security agreement." See, e.g., In re Fibre Glass Boat
Corp., 324 F. Supp. 1054, 1055-56 (S.D. Fla.), (yid mem., 448 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1971).
But see In re Penn Housing Corp., 367 F. Stipp. 661, 663 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
6" See, e.g„ Peterson v. Ziegler, — ill. App. 3d 	 , 350 N.E.2d 356 (1976). Clark
v. Vaughn, 504 S.W.2d 550, 551-52 (Tex. Civ. App, 1974); Kreiger v. Hartig, 1 I Wash.
App. 898, 900, 527 P.2d 483, 485 (1974). But see, e.g., Shelton v. Erwin, 472 F.2d 1118,
1120 (8th Cir. 1973) (see text at notes 15-23 supra); In re E.F. Anderson & Son, Inc., 12
UCC REP. SERv. 567, 570 (M.D. Ga. 1973); First County Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Canna, 124 N.J. Super. 154, 159, 305 A.2d 442, 445 (App. Div. 1973).
61 For example, a corporate resolution would be sufficient if it contained lan-
guage such as "Resolved, that the treasurer of this corporation is hereby authorized to
execute arid deliver to secured party a financing statement to cover secured party's se-
curity interest." See, e.g., In re Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d 1328, 1332 (1st Cir. 1973). But
we L & V Co. v. Asch, 267 Md. 251, 252, 297 A.2d 285, 286 (1972).
" "Account debtor" means "the person who is obligated on an account, chattel
paper or general intangible ...." UCC § 9-105 (1)(a),
'° For example, a letter should he sufficient if it contained language such as
"Please make your checks in payment for my services payable jointly to myself and se-
cured party." See, e.g., In re Nunnemaker Transportation Co., 456 F.2d 28, 31-32 (9th
Cir. 1972); In re Consolidated Steel Corp., l I UCC. REP. Seat- . 408, 410 (M.D. Fla.
1972); Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Capital Construction Co., 112 Ga. App. 189,
190-91, 144 S.E.2d 465, 466 (1965); rj: Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, 406 F. Supp. 452,
476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
64 See cases cited in notes 58-63 supra.
"s 504 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1974).
as
	 at 1057-00.
" Id. at 1058.
" /d.
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Courts have also held that a financing statement can meet the
minimum requirements of the section 9-203(1)(a) statute of frauds if
it contains language such as "this financing statement secures a note
for money advanced.""" These holdings are correct and consistent
with cases such as Amex-Protein because such financing statements con-
tain language referring to a security interest. Thus, while the financ-
ing statements may not "create" a security interest, they do "provide"
for such an interest. •
What of financing statements which do not contain such lan-
guage? A writing which meets the 'formal requisites of UCC section
9-402 for financing statements must refer to the secured status of a
possible secured party and must be, on its face, referable to and de-
scriptive of a possible security interest.'" Thus, a section 9-402 financ-
ing statement should serve as the minimum writing required by Arti-
cle Nine. However, while there is other commentary ';upport for this
proposition," judicial acceptance of it is totally lacking. Courts which
have considered the question have been troubled both by the absence
of active granting language in bare financing statements" . and by two
related arguments. First, it has been contended that a financing
statement cannot serve as a security agreement because the Code con-
templates the security agreement functioning as the writing which
creates a security interest and the financing statement functioning as
the writing which gives notice of a security interest." Second, the ar-
gument has been advanced that a financing statement should not be
viewed as providing the necessary minimum assurances of a possible
security interest because it can be executed and prefiled before a se-
curity agreement is actually entered into and may remain of record
even if agreement is never reached.'"
"See, e.g., Evans v. Everett, 279 NI:C. 352, 357-58, 183 S.E.2d 109, 112-13
(1971); First Nat'l Bank ,Sc Trust Co. v. Olivetti Corp., 130 Ga. App. 896, 898, '204
S.E.2d 781, 783 (1974). But See In re Taylor Mobile Homes, Inc., 17 UCC Rep. Seitv.
565, 568-69 (E. D. Mich. 1975); Musky v. Dallas Entertainment Co., 496 S.W.2d 237,
240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
7" UCC § 9-402(1): "A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of
the debtor and the secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the se-
cured party from which information concerning the security interest may be obtained,
gives a mailing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or
describing the items, of collateral." The use of a nominee as secured party is permissi-
ble. See In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23031.34 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
1670 (1976).
TI See generally 1 GiLmoRE, Aupra note 6, § 11.4, at 346-48; 6E BENDER'S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL. Coot: SERVICE, Reporter Digest 2-1679, 2-1683 (1976); J. WHITE 8, R.
SUMMERS, HANDBOOK 01 TfIE LAW UNDER rite UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE * 23-3, at 791
(1972) [hereinafter cited as UCC Handbook].
"See, e.g., Crete State Bank v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 195 Neb. 605, —, 239
N.W.2d 789, 791 (1976); 'Transport Equip. Co. v. Guaranty State Bank, 518 F.2d 377,
380 (10th Cir, 1975).
"See, e.g., Ira re Taylor Mobile Homes, Inc., 17 UCC Rio'. SERV. 565, 567 (E.D.
Mich. 1975); American Card Co., Inc. v. H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 62-63, 196 A,2d 150,
152 (1963).
74
 See, e.g., in re Shoreline Electric Supply, Inc., 18 UCC REI', SERV. 231, 235 (D.
Conn. 1975). See UCC 9-402(1).
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It has already been demonstrated that section 9-203(1)(a) does
not require active granting or conveying language. 75 Nor do these
other arguments require a holding that a financing statement contain-
ing the minimum language required by section 9-402 cannot rise to
the level of a section 9-203(1)(a) memorandum. First, the general
functional distinction between security agreements as writings which
create security interests and financing statements as writings which
give notice of security interests is accurate, but it does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that a financing statement cannot serve both
functions. Indeed, Professor Grant Gilmore, who was a principal
draftsman of Article Nine, has concluded that there is no sensible
basis for the discrepancies between the formal requisites in sections
9-203 and 9-402, and that a writing which conforms to section 9-402
is sufficient to satisfy the Article Nine statute of frauds. 76 Thus, the
notice function of a financing statement does not preclude it from
creating or providing for a security interest as well. Second, there is
also always the possibility that a financing statement alleged to be a
security agreement was actually prefiled for an anticipated secured
transaction which was never consumthated. 77 Such a prefiling might
be made to insure that the secured party would enjoy perfected status
from the date of the filing if a security agreement was ultimately en-
tered into and a security interest ultimately attached to the collateral.
On the other hand, it is at least as likely that a security agreement was
actually entered into either before or after the execution or filing of
the financing statement. In many reported cases the secured party
either prefiled and then actually entered into a security agreement
with the debtor or entered into such an agreement before he filed."
No signed writing, not even a formal security agreement, can provide
an absolute guarantee that an enforceable security interest in the col-
lateral described was in fact created." Consequently, the ability of
parties to prefile financing statements should not lead courts to con-
clude that such statements can not satisfy the Article Nine statute of
frauds.
When determining whether a writing provides the necessary
minimum evidence of a possible secured status and minimum
safeguard against fraudulent or mistaken claims, courts should con-
sider the commercial context. As a general matter, it is permissible to
75 See text at notes 54-79 supra.
78 See 1 GmNiottE..tupra note 6, § 11.4, at 346-48. Many courts have found that se-
curity agreements serve a notice function in addition to the creation function. See note
and text at note 123 infra.
u See generally UCC flAxrniocm.supra note 71, § 25-4.
7"
 Compare, e.g., Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. First Nat'l Jiank — Minn.
—, 238 N.W.2d 612, 613 (1976), with First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Atlas
Credit Corp., 417 F.2d 1081, 1082 (10th Cir. 1969).
" For example, the debtor's signature might have been procured through fraud.
Or, the agreement might not be enforceable by the secured party because of a failure
to give value. See UCC §§ 1-103; 9-203. See text at note 93 infra.
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use evidence of a commercial usage as well as other oral evidence of
the situation or relation of the parties and other surrounding circum-
stances at the time an agreement was allegedly made to explain a
memorandum produced for the purpose of satisfying a statute of
frauds." This principle should be applicable under the Code given its
emphasis on the importance of commercial context."' The Article
Nine definition of "security agreement", as expanded by the Article
One definition of "agreement," seemingly opens the door to contex-
tual explanation."' Thus, writings presented for the purpose of satis-
fying section 9-203(1)(a) should be read in the light of the commercial
usages of secured creditors and debtors and such other explanatory
evidence.
A bill of sale is an example of a document which, through such
explanation, may "create or provide" for a security interest. On its
face a bill of sale describes a possible sale, not a secured transaction.
Yet, Official Comment 4 to UCC section 9-203 indicates that a person
should be able to protect his "equity of redemption" by proving that
the bill of sale purporting to describe a sale resulting in the passage of
title from himself' as seller to a buyer actually describes a security
transfer and, in effect, creates or provides for a security interest." In
fact, bills of sale are used, on occasion, to memorialize security
agreements." On the authority of Comment 4, secured parties," as
well as debtors," have been permitted to introduce evidence demon-
"See generally 2 Cottismsupra note 57,14* 5'27-28.
" See generally Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode; An Essay on the
Jurisprudence of our New Commercial Law, 11	 REV. 213, 227-29, 250-53 (1966),
" UCC §§ 1-201(3), 9-105(1)(1). UCC 1-201, Comment 3 states: "As used in
this Act the word [agreement] is intended to include full recognition of usage of trade,
course of dealing, course of performance and the surrounding circumstances as effec-
tive parts thereof ...." This statutory mandate to the courts to look beyond the four
corners of a written document to ascertain the parties' true intent is consistent with the
Code's policy of permitting continued expansion of commercial practices by measuring
commercial persons' obligations in a commercial context. UCC § 1-102 states: "(1) This
Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and
policies. (2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are ... (b) to permit the con-
tinued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the
parties ...." For examples of cases that employ contextual explanation in determining
whether a security interest was created, see In re Numeric Corp., 485 F.2d 1328, 1332
(Ist Cir. 1973); In re Penn Housing Corp.. 367 F. Supp. 661, 662-65 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
The extent to which the parol evidence rule and principles of' contract interpretation
might affect efforts to explain is discussed in the notes and text at notes 110 & 161
infra,
" UCC § 9-203, Comment 4:
Under this Article as under prior law a debtor may show by parol evi-
dence that a transfer purporting to be absolute was in fact for security and
may then, on payment of the debt, assert his fundamental right to return
of the collateral and execution of an acknowledgement of satisfaction.
See UCC § 2-106(1).
"See l Gil,MOR•„ciipra note 6, § 2.6, at 48-49.
" E.g., Wambach v. Randall, 484 F.2d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 1973). See generally
GILMORE, Supra note 6, § 2.6, at 50 n.9.
"See, e.g., In re Joseph Kranner Hat Co., 482 F.2d 937, 939-40 (2d Cir. 1973).
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strating that both written agreements absolute in form as well as bills
of sale actually represent security agreements.
Leases of personalty should be viewed with a similar commercial
understanding. On their face, leases evidence a possible transaction in
which both the lessor and the lessee have an interest in the leased
personalty. Their interests, depending on the terms of the lease and
other factors, may actually be that of Article Nine secured creditor
and debtor." Thus, there should be no restriction on the admission
of extrinsic evidence showing that a lease of personalty does in fact
"create or provide" for a security interest in the personalty which is
the subject of the lease."
UCC § 9-102(2) states that the "Article applies to security interests created by
... lease ...." The UCC 1-201(37) provides a test for determining whether a lease
actually creates a security interest:
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the
facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does
rum of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agree-
ment that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall be-
come or has the option to become the owner of the property for no addi-
tional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease
one intended for security.
" For an example of a case where the court admitted extrinsic evidence to de-
termine that a lease created or provided for a security interest, see in re Telemax Corp.,
10 UCC REP. Setts. 1316, 1318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
It is possible for a court to determine that a transaction is, in reality, a lease for
security subject to Article Nine as distinguished from a true lease, but that the writings
which evidence the transaction are not sufficient tinder § 9-203. In re Lufkin, 15 UCC
REV. SERV. 708 (1). Me. 1974), is an example. f n Lufkin the collateral, a tractor which the
debtor had originally taken possession of pursuant to a written memorandum of an oral
agreement which contained an option to purchase, had been rightfully repossessed.
The rental document was not signed by the debtor, but did describe the collateral. The
debtor wrote the creditor expressing his understanding of the necessity for the repos-
session and promising to make future payments on time. The sending of the letter
which was signed by the debtor and which described the collateral, along with the pay-
ment of the arrearages, resulted in the return of the collateral. The court concluded,
after considering a variety of evidence extrinsic to the writings, that a security agree-
ment rather than :t bona fide lease was intended, at least from the time that the parties
finalized the arrangement for the return of the tractor. The court also acknowledged
that it would seeni appropriate to consider the rental document and the letter written
by the debtor together as a security agreement. Nonetheless, the court found that
although the letter is signed by the debtor, it neither creates nor provides
for a security interest. ... The rental memorandum might be said to
create or provide for a security interest ... inasmuch as it constitutes a
lease with an option to purchase, but it was not signed by the debtor.
Moreover, it would appear that the security interest itself actually was
created by oral agreement between the parties and therefore that it is not
enforceable under § 9-203(1)(a) and (b).
/d. at 711-12 (citations omitted). If the court had found an enforceable security interest,
it would have been unperfected for lack of filing. This lack of filing was the sounder
basis on which to hold in favor of the bankruptcy trustee.
Admitting extrinsic evidence in order to determine whether a lease is a true lease
or a lease for security may be reconcilable with a highly regulatory interpretation of §
9-203 because both approaches may be seen as working to protect third parties. There
is a probable judicial bias that most leases are disguised security agreements which can
16
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The question of whether a writing "creates or provides for a
security interest" becomes more difficult when an alleged secured
party produces a document which lacks express granting language;
which is not, on its face, referable to a security agreement, security in-
terest, secured status, or any other sort of in rem rights or status with
respect. to personalty; and which is not sometimes used by secured
creditors and debtors to evidence what is actually a secured transac-
tion. A promissory note on which an alleged secured party is named
payee, but which contains no reference to a possible secured transac-
tion, would be an example of such a writing." Since such a hare
promissory' note is consistent with both secured and unsecured status,
should the alleged secured party be permitted to establish a security
interest. through the use of explanatory extrinsic evidence? Permitting
a creditor to introduce extrinsic evidence of secured status upon the
production of a bare promissory note might open the door to false or
mistaken claims of security which interested third persons would have
difficulty rebutting. Additionally, the debtor, usually insolvent, may
have little reason to carefully consider or rebut the false or mistaken
claims of secured status." The issue must be resolved against the al-
leged secured party in such a case, not because triers of fact are not
able to sift out fraudulent or mistaken claims most of the time, but
because Article Nine should be read as requiring that the writing evi-
dence a possible secured transaction. The circumstances surrounding
the execution of the note might demonstrate an intent to create a se-
curity interest.'" Such evidence, however, would have the effect of
affect the admissibility and the weight that a court is willing to give to different types of
evidence relevant to intent. See generally Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial
Code on Equipment Leasing, 1972 ILL L. F. 446, 448, 451-52. This bias is at least partially
fo unded on judicial diilike for "secret liens" of which persons who deal with the
lessee-debtor have no notice. See In re Lockwood, 16 UCC REV. SERN'. 195, 199 (D. Conn.
1974). A bias in favor of protecting third persons may also he found in cases where the
issue is the sufficiency of a writing under § 9-203. See notes and text at notes 119-23
infra.
The question of whether a lease is a true lease may be said to depend on the in-
tent of the parties, but their actual intent may have little to do with the outcome. See
UCC § 1-201(37). Radler. it is the conmiercial and economic reality of the device
created by the parties which controls. Thus, the objective of this determination of intent
is different from the intent-finding process in contractual interpretation, where actual
intention is sought to have binding effect. Under either process, however, the parol
evidence rule should not operate to prevent the admission or evidence extrinsic to the
writing in order to determine "intent," Sec note 90 in/1'a. See Peden, The Treatment q'
Equipment Lenses as Security Agreement and the UnifOrm Commercial Code, 13 Wm. & MARI' L.
Rr.•. 110, 136 -40 (1971); Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Equip-
ment Leasing, 1972 ILL L. F. 446, 451-52.
""Sep, e,g., McCorquodale v, Holiday, Inc., 90 Nev. 67, 69-70, 518 P.2d 1097,
1098 (1974); In re Nottingham, 6 UCC REP. SERV, 1197 (E.D, Tenn. 1969).
"Rut Are In Re Metzler, 405 F. Stipp, 622, 623-24 (N.D. Ala. 1975) (Bankrupt
debtor did take interest in claim of alleged secured party).
"' See In re Overbrook	 Barson's, Inc., 5 UCC RE.r. SERV, 546, 549-52 (E.D. Pa.
1968), affd, 304 F. Stipp. '233 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
Evidence of a course of dealing or other circumstances peculiar to the secured
creditor and debtor should be admissible to interpret a writing if a § 9-203(1)(a)
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varying or supplementing the contents of the note. There is nothing
in the writing which can be interpreted or explained to show such an
intent. Thus, to permit a creditor to establish secured status on the
basis of such a writing would violate the section 9-20 l(1)(a) statute of
frauds because it provides no evidence of a possible secured status nor
does it protect against mistaken or fraudulent claims of secured
status. 2
None of the writings which, as suggested above," meet section
9-203( I)(a)'s requirement that a writing create or provide for a se-
curity interest additionally serve to insure that a security agreement
was actually made. Yet, findings of noncompliance with section
9-203(1)(a) have provided a convenient, albeit an analytically incor-
rect, basis for courts to hold against an alleged secured party in in-
stances where they doubted that there was, in fact, the intent to enter
into a security agreement." It would be preferable for courts to rec-
ognize that the statute of frauds hurdle may be cleared by a variety of
writings ranging from a formal security agreement to a bare financing
statement or bill of sale, but that these writings may carry different
evidentiary weights in demonstrating that there was a security agree-
ment. For example, a secured party that relies on a bare financing
statement to overcome the statute of frauds threshold might have to
introduce more extrinsic evidence of his secured status than would a
secured party who can produce a financing statement and a promis-
sory note which both contain passive references to a security
interest." In this vein, it is to be hoped that those courts that continue
to take a more restrictive view of the "create or provide" language
than that suggested herein will recognize that even if a bare financing
statement, a promissory note with a passive reference to a security in-
terest, or other such documents are not seen as meriting security
agreement status individually, such documents may cumulatively pro-
vide the requisite minimum assurances of a possible security agree-
ment required by section 9-203(1)(a)."
memorandum is present. See, e.g., Bramble Trans., Inc. v. Sam Senter Sales, Inc., 294
A.2d 97, 102-03 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971), afrd, 294 A.2d 104 (Del. 1972). See note and
text at note 90 supra. But see Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, —
Minn, —, —, 238 N.W.2d 612, 614-15 (1976).
"See In re Nottingham, 6 UCC REP. SERV, 1197, 1199 (E.D. Tenn. 1969). See gen-
erally J. CALAMARI .44 J. PERI1.1.0, TitE LAW or CoNTRAcrs § 308 (1970). Query whether
the existence of "part performance" should enable the alleged secured party to go for-
ward despite the lack of a sufficient writing? See In re Trucker's Intl, Inc., 17 UCC REP.
Si-Jtv, 1337, 1342 n.4 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
13
 See notes and text at notes 59-63 supra.
"See In re Shoreline Electric Supply, Inc., 18 UCC REP. St:Rt.. 231, 235-36 (D.
Conn. 1975).
"' The parol evidence rule and principles of contract interpretation may affect
the consideration of such evidence by a court, See notes and text at notes 110 & 16 1
infra.
"See In re Penn Housing Corp., 367 F. Supp. 661, 662-64 (W.D. Pa. 1973). One
document may "create or provide" while another may contain the description of the col-
lateral. See, e.g., In re Center Auto Parts, 6 UCC REP. SERS•. 398, 399-400 (C.D. Cal.
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2. The Requirement that the Writing Contain a Description of the
Collateral
One purpose of the writing requirement, according to the
draftsmen's comments, is to provide some evidence of what property
is subject to the security interest created by a security agreement." As
a result, in addition to requiring a writing which "creates or provides
for a security interest," Article Nine also requires that the writing con-
tain a description of the collateral." By requiring a description that
"reasonably identifies what is described," and which "make[s] possible
the identification of the thing described," the draftsmen intended a
break with pre-Code requirements of exact and detailed descrip-
tions." Since the adequacy of particular descriptions is tested on a
case by case basis and has generated considerable litigation,"" it is
important to analyze more closely the purpose of the description re-
quirement.
As part of the Article Nine statute of frauds, the description re-
quirement seeks to provide both minimum written evidence that a
security interest in the alleged collateral was intended, as well as
minimum protection against mistaken or fraudulent claims of security
in particular collateral.'" Whether the description provides such evi-
dence and protection is the precise issue that a court must resolve
when it is asked to test a description against section 9-203(1)(a).
A description, such as "all debtor's inventory," which is broad
enough to include the particular collateral claimed should be ade-
1968). In cases where tme writing is signed and others are not, there should he no flat
requirement of a completely identifying internal reference in the signed writing to the
unsigned papers. Extrinsic evidence should be admissible to link the various writings
together. See, e.g. In re Amex-Protein Development Corp., 504 F.2d 1056, 1060-61 (9th
Cir. 1974). See generally 2 Counts:.supm note 57, §§ 512, 515. There should be no prob-
lem in relating multiple documents if they arc all signed and they all relate to the same
transactism. See, e.g., Amex-Protein. But see In re Shoreline Electric Supply, Inc., 18 UCC
REF'. SERI'. 231 (D. Corm. 1975). Multiple writings should he useable for purposes of
satisfying § 9.203(1)(a) even if the parties actually intended but failed to execute a for-
mal security agreement. E,g., In re Numeric, 485 F.2d 1328, 1331 (1st. Cir. 1973). But see
In re Taylor Mobile Homes, 17 UCC SERV. 565, 569 (E.D, Mich. 1975).
17 UCC § 9-203, Comment 3.
"" See text at notes 7-10 supra.
"" UCC § 9.110 & Comment. The secured party can have a security interest in
proceeds of any kind even if the security agreement does not describe or mention
them. UCC. § 9-203(3); 9-306(1). The word "proceeds" alone is an adequate description
to cover proceeds of any kind tinder the 1962 Official Text. UCC § 9-203(1)(b) (1962
Text).
1 ""See generally Burke, Secured Trawactionc, 31 Bus. Law. 1583, 1589-90 (1976);
Note, 27 OKLA, L. REV, 469, 474-76 (1974); Recent. Cases, 39 Mo. L. REv, 75, 77.78
(1974).
1 " 1 UCC § 9-203, Comment 5; UCC HANDnooK,supra note 71, § 23.3, at 787-88.
The definition of security agreement as an agreement which "creates or provides for a
security interest" would seem to require some description dl' collateral even if a descrip-
tion term was not specifically required.
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quate for section 9-203(I)(a) purposes.'" This description provides
minimum evidence that the dimensions of the alleged security interest
can be no greater than all the debtor's inventory, and rules out an en-
forceable security interest in assets not described, such as accounts re-
ceivable or equipment. It both provides minimum protection against
mistaken or fraudulent claims of secured status and makes it possible
to identify what inventory, if any, is actually encumbered. Thus, con-
trary to the decision in Middle Atlantic,'° 3 a security interest in "ac-
counts" should be sufficient for purposes of section 9-203(1)(a) to in-
clude present and future accounts. Further, contrary to the decision
in In re Laminated Veneers Co.,'" a security interest in "equipment"
should be sufficient to include a particular automobile used as equip-
ment by the debtor.'° 5
 In both cases, since the descriptions satisfied
the Article Nine statute of frauds, the parties should have been per-
mitted to introduce evidence of whether they actually intended the
security interest to cover the claimed assets.'"
Of course, such broad descriptions are most often used to de-
scribe a security interest which is intended to attach to all or substan-
tially all of the debtor's assets within the described class, and are often
accompanied by a list of subclasses of assets or particular assets within
the broad class. Such descriptions can be troublesome. 1 ° 7 For exam-
ple, it may be alleged that the security agreement description "all the
debtor's equipment including punch presses, drill presses, lathes, and
"2 See, e.g., UGC 1.1AsmilooK, supra note 71, § 23-3, at 788; Security Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Mass, 246 Ark. 1113, 1116-18, 441 S.W.2d 91, 93-94 (1969); cf. 1 Gii.NuntE.
supra note 6, § 11.4 at 350. An appropriate perspective to adopt when measuring the
breadth of a description and other aspects of its adequacy is discussed in the notes and
text at notes 152-55 in/re.
A court may riot be willing to narrow the effect of a broad description by includ-
ing only certain items within the description where the court concludes that the descrip-
tion is not ambiguous. See note 110 Mira. If the description is contained in a completely
integrated writing, the parol evidence rule may operate to exclude evidence that a se-
curity interest in specific items only was intended. UCC H ANDBOOK.,.supra note 71, §
23-3, at 788-89.
"3 503 1',2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1974). See notes and text at notes 24-30 supra.
1-" 471 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1973). See notes and text at notes 31-36 supra.
"3 Concerning the use of even broader security agreement descriptions, see Leas-
ing Service Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 19 UCC SERV. 252, 261
(DAT 1976); f u re Lockwood, 16 UGC REP. SERv. 195, 200 (1). Conn. 1974); James
-falcon, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 292 Minn. Rep. 277, 285-88, 194 N.W.2d 775,
781-83 (1972).
'" It has been argued that a description such as "all debtor's inventory" can be
adequate for § 9-203(1)(a) purposes only when there is an actual intent to cover all the
debtor's inventory. Comment, 19 N.Y.L.F. 365, 374 (1973). Presumably, evidence of in-
tent would be admitted under § 9.203(1)(a) for the limited purpose of measuring the
description's adequacy. The approach taken in this paper is one advocating the facilita-
tion of intent. This approach would first consider whether a description is broad
enough to satisfy the Article Nine statute of frauds for the property in dispute. Actual
intent to encumber the asset would then he determined in order that the security agree-
ment could be enforced according to the parties' actual intent.
t"rSee the descriptions used in Laminated Veneers and Michell in the text at notes
32 & 38 supra.
20
r4RTICLE NINE SECURITY INTERESTS
all other machinery used in debtor's machine shop" includes a desk-
top computer owned by the debtor and used in his business offices
when the security agreement was entered into and value was given.
This description is an adequate description of the computer tinder the
Article Nine statute of frauds because the computer is a part of the
debtor's equipment. The real issue is whether the parties actually
intended the security interest to attach to the computer. 108 As the
written description can be no more than evidence of intent, this de-
scription could be used to support arguments both for or against an
intent to encumber the computer. The parties' intent must be ascer-
tained through the process of contract interpretation which is gov-
erned by extra-Code law and in which, contrary to the approach
taken in Mitchell,'" evidence of meaning extrinsic to the writing
should always be admissible whether or not the writing seems
ambiguous."° On the other band, an alleged secured party should
1 "14 The real issue of intent may be confused with the question of the adequacy of
the description for § 9.203(1)(a) purposes. See, e.g., In re Little Brick Shirthouse, 10
UCC REP. SERV. 1360, 1362 (N.D. 111. 1972). These issues were not clearly delineated in
Laminated Veneers and Mitchell discussed in the notes and text at notes 31-49 supra.
"'See text at notes 37-49 supra.
"° See cases cited in note 49 supra. Under Professor Corbin's view, extrinsic evi-
dence may always be introduced for purposes of interpreting a writing:
lElxtrinsic evidence is always necessary in the interpretation of a written
instrument: in determining the meaning and intention of the parties who
executed or relied upon it, in applying it to the objects and persons in-
volved in the litigated or otherwise disputed issues, in determining the
specific legal operation that justice requires to be given to the written in-
strument. In this process of interpretation, no relevant credible evidence is
inadmissible merely because it is extrinsic; all such evidence is necessarily
extrinsic. When a court makes the often repeated statement that the writ-
ten words are so plain and clear and unambiguous that they need no in-
terpretation and that evidence is not admissible, it is making an interpreta-
tion on the sole basis of the extrinsic evidence of its own linguistic experi-
ence and education, of which it merely takes judicial notice.
The so-called parol evidence rule is not a rule of evidence and has
no application in the process of interpretation of a written instrument. It is
now most commonly described as a rule of substantive law, even by a court
that erroneously applies it to exclude relevant credible evidence. The sup-
posed rule is so variable in its formulation, and its application as an ex-
clusionary rule is so generally avoided in so many ways, that it is erroneous
and unjust to apply it for the purpose of excluding evidence that is of-
fered in aid of interpretation. When it is established by relevant credible
evidence that the parties have mutually assented to a specific written in-
strument as a complete and accurate statement of the terms of their con-
tract (an integration) and the words of that instrument have been properly
interpreted with the aid of all relevant extrinsic evidence, that instrument
operates as a discharge of all antecedent agreements and negotiations (oral
or written) that are inconsistent therewith. This is a rule of substantive
contract law, not a rule of evidence. Such antecedent agreements (oral or
written) are not rendered inadmissible in evidence; they are merely ren-
dered inoperative by having been discharged by a subsequent agreement
that has been duly proved and interpreted.
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L. Q. 161,
188-89 (1965). See generally 3 CORBIN, supra note 57, §§ 532.60, 573-96 (1960);
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not be allowed to prove that the security agreement description "one
Brand A desk-top computer, serial number X," was intended to de-
scribe the debtor's machine shop equipment. This description does
not provide the minimum written evidence and minimum protection
required by the Article Nine statute of frauds with respect to any per-
sonalty other than the computer[" because it is not broad enough to
include any other asset.
It is understandable that the issue of the adequacy of a security
agreement description under section 9-203(1)(a) and the issue of what
the parties actually intended are not often clearly delineated in such
cases where the same writings may be relevant to both questions. But
it is important that each be separately analyzed to avoid making the
written description requirement a higher barrier against proof of in-
tent than was actually intended by the UCC's draftsmen.
3. No Other Required Terms
While Article Nine expressly requires a writing which creates or
provides for a security interest and which contains a description of the
collateral, the presence of other terms which one might normally ex-
pect to find in a security agreement are not prerequisites to enforce-
ability, even though they might lend credence to a claim that a security
agreement was actually made." 2
 For example, there is no express re-
quirement that the writing contain provisions describing the in-
debtedness secured or the events which would constitute a default by
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or CONTRACTS §§ 238, 240 (Tent. Drafts. Nos. 1.7, 1973). The
parol evidence rule contained in the sales article of the UCC does not operate to ex-
clude extrinsic evidence introduced for interpretive purposes. See UCC § 2-202, Com-
ment 2; See generally 3 CORBIN, supra note 57, § 579. The parol evidence rule cannot
apply for any purpose if the writing is not an integration. see 3 CORBIN, supra note 57, §
582, and many of the writings which have been held to rise to the level of a security
agreement are unlikely candidates for this status. See note and text at note 64 supra. It
must be noted, however, that many courts do not agree with Professor Corbin's ap-
proach. These courts apply the "plain meaning rule" which does not permit resort to
extrinsic evidence if the writing appears to the court to be unambiguous on its face. See
Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, — Minn. —, —, 238 N.W.2d
612, 614-15 (1976). See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 50, at 97-98
(1970). It should further be noted that this process of interpretation is a two-edged
sword, since in this process, bankruptcy trustees and other interested third parties are
free to prove that a narrower security interest than that apparently described in the
security agreement was actually intended. In fact, bankruptcy trustees have been suc-
cessful in demonstrating that the actual, intended security interest is narrower than the
described security interest. They certainly should always be free to do so. E.g., In re
Hardin, 11 UCC REP. SERV. 392, 394-95 (E.D. Wis.), affd, 458 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1972);
In re Eshleman, 10 UCC REP. SERV. 750, 752-53 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See generally Note, 34
U. Pm.. L. REV. 691, 696-97 (1973).
'" See note and text at note 157 infra.
"! Section 9-203, Comment 3 states: "One purpose of the formal requisites
stated in subsection (1)(a) is evidentiary. The requirement of written record minimizes
the possibility of future dispute as to the terms of a security agreement and as to what
property stands as collateral for the obligation secured."
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the debtor in order for a writing to rise to the level of a security
agreement, although some courts have suggested that such provisions
are required.'" In response to this judicial suggestion, it should be
noted that the possession of the collateral by the secured party is a
statutory substitute for a writing which complies with all formal re-
quirements. While it is true that the evidentiary need for a written rec-
ord is greater when the collateral is in the debtor's possession,'" one
learns nothing about such matters as the size of the indebtedness or
what will constitute a default from the fact that a secured party is in
possession. Perhaps it is dangerous to make too much of the equiva-
lence of possession of the collateral for possessory security and the
writing requirement for nonpossessory security, given that there is
often a writing dealing with such matters in a pledge transaction," 5
and given that pledge law, which had worked for hundreds of years
before nonpossessory security became a commercial necessity, was not
to be lightly tampered with by the draftsmen of Article Nine in creat-
ing a new statutory writing requirement.'" However, a potential se-
cured creditor seeking knowledge of matters such as the size of the
debt or acts of default is no better off if he learns that a secured party
is in possession of collateral than if he learns that the collateral is de-
scribed in a financing statement which provides the name and address
of the secured party.'" Thus, the equivalence of possession and the
"E.g., Needle V. Lasco Indus., Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 1105, 1108-09, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 593, 595-96 (1970); White v. Household Fin. Corp., 302 N.E.2d 828, 837 (Ind.)
App. 1973).
It could be argued that UCC § 9-203 does require a signed agreement which
creates or provides for a security interest and that it would be difficult to conclude that
such an agreement had been reached if no debt was specified. This argument might be
bolstered by the definition of security interest contained in UCC § 1-201(37) as "an in-
terest in personal property ... which secures payment or performance of an obliga-
tion." See Needle v. Lasco Indus., 10 Cal. App. 3d 1105, 1107-09, 89 Cal. Rptr. 593,
594-96 (1970). Such an argument is not persuasive in light of the Code's lack of an ex-
press debt description requirement, particularly when it is realized that such a require-
ment was common under pre-Code law. See 1 BENDER'S UCC § 3.16(1)(b)(1974). It
is also not persuasive because the purpose of UCC § 9-203 is to provide minimum writ-
ten evidence of a possible security agreement and not to require an entire, integrated
written security agreement. Moreover, it is not possible to determine the size of the ob-
ligation secured from the mere fact of possession by a secured party under a possessory
security interest.
There is no statutory requirement that the writing contain an express after-
acquired property clause if a security interest in after-acquired property was intended.
See note 29 supra.
"'See UCC § 9-203, Comment 3.
its Id.
"g The draftsmen of Article Nine did consider the codification of the law of
pledges with some modifications. See UCC 11§ 7-201 through 7-210 (May 1949 draft).
However, they did not add a writing requirement. Id. at 7-202. See generally 1 GILMORE,
supra note 6, § 1.6.
"I See UCC § 9-402. The formal requirements for a financing statement and its
notice function are considered in the notes and text at notes 125-29 infra. At least one
state does require that information concerning the size of the debt be provided in a
financing statement. See Kv. REV. STAT, § 355.9-402(I).
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writing requirement for nonpossessory security provides support for
the notion that Article Nine requires no more than a writing which
creates or provides for a security interest and which contains a de-
scription of the collateral.
13. Purposes of the Writing Requirement
In the preceding discussion of the statutory language of Article
Nine, it has been established that the writing required by section
9-203(1)(a) has as its function the provision of minimum written evi-
dence that a security interest in the alleged collateral was intended as
well as the provision of minimum protection against mistaken or
fraudulent claims of security in particular collateral. While writing re-
quirements in general may serve a variety of other purposes," 8 none
of these should be read into section 9-203(1)(a) so as to require magic
words or security agreement language in addition to that previously
discussed.
I. Third Party Protection
The protection of the expectations of third persons plays an im-
portant role in judicial determinations of the sufficiency of writings
claimed to be security agreements. As demonstrated by the decisions
in Middle Atlantic," 9 -Laminated Veneers,'" and Mitchell,'" the courts
often may be concerned that a security agreement description is so
vague, ambiguous or incomplete that a third party cannot determine
whether a security interest was created in particular assets of the
debtor. In essence, courts fear that to accept the secured party's ar-
guments concerning the existence or scope of the alleged security in-
terest would be to sanction judicially what may amount to a secret
lien.' 22 Therefore, courts posit an important notice function for se-
curity agreements. 128 A determination of the type of notice function
intended by Article Nine's draftsmen necessitates a general discussion
of notice under Article Nine.
119 Professor Perillo has indicated that contractual formalities can have at least
nine broadly outlined legal functions. Perillo, supra note 57, at 43-69. Only those which
UCC § 9-203 might conceivably further are discussed in the text.
119 503 F.2d 1 133 (3d Cir. 1974). See text at notes 24-30 supra.
11° 471 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1973). See text at notes 31-36 supra.
121 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972). See text at note 44 supra.
In re Lockwood, 16 UCC REP. SERA'. 195, 199 (D. Conn. 1974). Concern for
the protection of third parties is most often voiced in cases concerning the adequacy of
security agreement descriptions. See notes and text at notes 24-30 supra. It also appears
in cases in which the issue is whether a particular writing "creates or provides" for a se-
curity interest. See Morey Mach. Co. v. Great Western Indus. Mach. Co., 507 F.2d 987,
990 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
' 2 ' See, e.g., In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co., 503 F.2d 1133, 1136 (3d Cir.
1974); In re Laminated Veneers Co., 471 F.2d 1124, 1125 (2d Cir. 1973); Mitchell v.
Shepherd Mall State Bank, 324 F. Supp. 1029, 1033 (W.D. Okla. 1971), affd, 458 F.2d
700 (10th Cir. 1972).
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Article Nine's draftsmen determined that a notice filing system
was appropriate for publicizing most nonpossessory security interests
in order that third parties might become aware of them.'" The
financing statement which can be filed as a notice document under
this system is sufficiently descriptive if' it contains "a statement indicat-
ing the types, or describing the items, of collateral."'" •
Uniform Commercial Code section 9-110, which states that for
purposes of Article Nine "any description of personal property or real
estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably iden-
tifies what is described,"'" fills out this description requirement.
Many courts have permitted the use of broad descriptions in financ-
ing statements when the collateral consisted of fluid assets such as ac-
counts or inventory because a more complete or specific description
would be impossible without periodic refilings which are not required
by the Code.' 27 Courts have also permitted broad financing statement
1 • See UCC § 9-402, Comment 2; Coogan, Public Notice under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Filing," 47 IowA L. Rcv.
289, 317-19 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Coogan]. The system was not designed to pro-
vide complete protection for third parties. Professor Coogan points out that even if a
person determines that there are no filings against the collateral in which he is in-
terested, and that a secured party is not in possession of the collateral in which he is in-
terested, it would be dangerous for him to assume that no person will be able to suc-
cessfully claim priority in the collateral. For example, the property in which he is in-
terested might be subject to other security interests that may he perfected automatically
without either filing or possession. Id. at 339, 342-43. In addition to the many pitfalls
fully discussed by Professor Coogan, there are others. For example, under UCC §
9-402(7), a financing statement may be effective even if the debtor has changed his
name. See Continental Oil Co. v. Citizens Trust & Savings Bank,—Mich.—,--, 244
N.W.2d. 243, 244-45 (1976); UCC § 9-402, Comment 7; UCC HANDBOOK, supra note
71, §23-16, at 837-41. Also under UCC § 9.402(7), a secured party is not under a duty
to refile where he knows of or consented to a debtor's transfer of the collateral to a new
debtor. See generally Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HAM L. REV. 477, 526-27
(1973).
1 " UCC §§ 9-402(1); 9-403(4). There arc special description requirements for
realty-related personalty such as crops, minerals, arid fixtures. UCC §§ 9-402(1), (5). A
copy of a security agreement may he filed instead of a financing statement. UCC §
9-402(1).
1 " UCC § 9-110, It has been suggested that this criterion is so vague as to he of
little value and thus, that the description requirement for financing statements could be
dispensed with entirely. See Note, 4 V. L. REV, 205, 218.21 (1969). The draftsmen of
Article Nine rejected a suggestion that notice filing be eliminated in favor of other
safeguards. See 1 GD.moKE, supra note 6, § 15.1, at 463-65. Section 9-110 also fills out
the description requirements for security agreements. To explore the question whether
the differences in function between the security agreement and financing statement re-
quire a difference in the description employed, see UCC HANDBOOK, supra note 7 I ,
§ 23.3, at 787-88. See note and text at note 76 supra.
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 Heights v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, —Pa. —,
	 342 A.2d 738, 743 (1975);
UCC § 9-402, Comment 2. See UCC HANDBOOK supra note 71, §23-16, at 843-46; Note,
27 OKLA. L. REV. 469, 470-74 (1974). A financing statement description new and used
automobiles" has been held sufficient to indicate that a security interest in future au-
tomobiles was contemplated when it was apparent from the financing statement that the
debtor was an automobile dealer. See Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304, 1309
(9th Cit . . 1973); Bank of Utica v. Smith Richfield Springs, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 113, 114,
294 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
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descriptions to describe nonfluid assets. 128 These liberal cases are cor-
rectly decided in light of the two functions contemplated by the
Code's draftsmen for the financing statement: to provide a bare-bones
notice that a security interest may exist presently or in the future in
the collateral described; and to provide minimal additional informa-
tion, such as the immediate parties' names and addresses, so that in-
terested persons can investigate further to obtain other information
such as the precise nature of the collateral, the size of the debt se-
cured, or the conditions of default.' 29
What can the interested third person do once he has learned
that there may be a security interest? He can become a disinterested
third party. Or, he can contact the secured party named in the financ-
ing statement for details. Although the secured party is not under an
Article Nine duty to respond to third party inquiries,"° he may be es-
topped from asserting a security interest if he fails to reveal it"' or
provides incorrect information about it." 2 Alternatively, the interested
person can contact the debtor. If the third person does not wish to
rely on the debtor's representations, section 9-208 of Article Nine
provides a procedure under which the debtor may obtain certain in-
formation from the secured party. 133 The information which can be
'" For example, in In re Stegman, 15 UCC REP. SERV. 225, 226-29 (S.D. Fla.
1974) the court held that the description "various equipment, see Schedule A attached
hereto" was adequate even though the schedule was not attached. Accord, e.g., In re
Turnage, 493 F.2d 505, 506-07 (5th Cir. 1974); Maryland Nat'l Bank v. Porter-Way
Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8, 9-11 (Del. 1972). Contra, e.g., In re Lehner, 427 F.2d
357, 358 (10th Cir. 1970). See generally UCC HANDBOOK, supra note 71, § 23-16, at
843-46. Although the Code permits the use of generic financing statement descriptions,
there are practical reasons for using a more specific description. See Coogan, supra note
124, at 322-26.
19 UCC § 9-402 & Comment 2. As to whether an after-acquired property clause
is required in a financing statement, see e.g., James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank,
292 Minn. 277, 288-92, 194 N.W.2d 775, 783-85 (1972). See note 127 supra.
' 3° See Opinion of Attorney General of Virginia, 9 UCC REP. SERV. 974 (1971),
interpreting UCC § 9-208. Although the secured party is not under a duty to respond,
the address which appears for him on the financing statement is required to be one
from which information concerning the security interest may be obtained. UCC §
9-402(1).
13 ' UCC § 1-103. See, e.g., United States v. Gleaners & Farmers Coop. Elevator
Co., 314 F. Supp. 1148, 1149-50 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Mason State Bank v. Diamond, —
N.W.2d —, 16 UCC REP. SERV. 1168, 1174-80 (Iowa 1975).
' 33 See, e.g., Avco Delta Corp. v. United States, 459 F.2d 436, 440-42 (7th Cir.
1972); Central Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Bank & Trust Co., 528 P.2d 710,
713 (Okla. 1974).
' 33 UCC § 9-208 provides in part:
(I)	 A debtor may sign a statement indicating what he believes to be the
aggregate amount of unpaid indebtedness as of a specified date and
may send it to the secured party with a request that the statement
be approved or corrected and returned to the debtor. When the
security agreement or any other record kept by the secured party
identifies the collateral a debtor may similarly request the secured
party to approve or correct a list of the collateral.
(2)	 The secured party must comply with such a request within two
weeks after receipt by sending a written correction or approval. If
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obtained by a debtor on behalf of a third person under section 9-208
is the amount of the indebtedness and a list of collateral.'" A third
party receives protection directly by virtue of this provision in the
situation where: the debtor properly includes in his request a good
faith statement of the obligation and list of collateral; the secured
party fails to approve or correct the statement or list in writing with-
out a reasonable excuse; and the third party is actually misled. In
such cases, the security interest is limited by the statement and list
supplied by the debtor. Since, in the event of litigation, the interested
third party would presumably have the burden of showing both that
the debtor's statement of the obligation or list of collateral was pre-
pared in good faith' 35 and that he was misled by the debtor's rep-
resentations, the availability of this relief may not place upon secured
parties strong pressure to comply. While the spectre of monetary lia-
bility to the debtor which can result under section 9-208 may cause
most secured parties to comply,' 36 that will not provide solace to the
third party who is unable to prove all of the necessary elements in his
effort to have a noncomplying secured party forfeit all or part of a
security interest. Despite the limitations of section 9-208, an interested
third person clearly has the burden of further investigation under Ar-
ticle Nine if a financing statement containing an adequate description
of the property was properly filed.'"
the secured party claims a security interest in all of a particular type
of collateral owned by the debtor he may indicate that fact in his
reply and need not approve or correct an itemized list of such col-
lateral. If the secured party without reasonable excuse fails to com-
ply he is liable for any loss caused to the debtor thereby; and if the
debtor has properly included •in his request a good faith statement
of the obligation or a list of the collateral or both the secured party
may claim a security interest only as shown in the statement against
persons misled by his Failure to comply ....
This mechanism has been criticized as inadequate. Coogan, supra note 124, at 344-45; 1
GILMORE, supra note 6, § 15.3, at 472-75. Concerning the necessity or a written request
by the debtor, see Rainey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 294 Ala. 139, 143, 313 So. 2(1. 179,
183 (1975).
'" See In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S.
Ct. 1670 (1976). A secured party may have to reveal the location of collateral in order
to comply with UCC § 9-208. See Owen v. McKesson & Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp.
1327, 1335 (N.D. Fla. 1972). A secured party who has made a representation under
UCC § 9-208 is not precluded from taking additional collateral or making an additional
advance even if the enlarged security interest would be perfected through the original
filing and, thus, have priority over the person who acquired information. Coogan, supra
note 124, at 345. But see Coin-o-Matic Serv. Co. v, Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co„ 3
UCC REP. SERV. 1112 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1966). The reasoning in Goin-o-Matic has generally
not been accepted. See UCC HANDBOOK, supra note 71, § 25-4, at 908.
'" 'Good faith" is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned." UCC §§ 1-201(19); 9-105(4). Thus, a list in which the debtor, through inadver-
tence, omitted certain items of collateral would meet the "good faith" requirement.
'39 See I GILMORE, supra note 6, § 15.3, at 475.
' 37
 The burden has been described in different ways and is, in part, a function of
the specificity which a court believes Article Nine requires in financing statement de-
scriptions. For example, in Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir.
1973), the court stated:
27
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
What role should the security agreement play in this process of
discovery? Many courts have reasoned that its role in this respect is
significant and that the security agreement itself must be considered a
notice document.' 38 In this vein, it has been suggested that the ade-
quacy of a security agreement description may be measured by more
liberal standards where the issue of enforceability arises between the
immediate parties rather than between an immediate party and a
third party.'" A copy of the security agreement might be made avail-
able to a third party by the secured party or the debtor during the
course of the third party's inquiry. However, cases emphasizing. this
notice function rarely indicate that any third person did in fact rely
on a copy of the security agreement in deciding to give value.' 40 In
the absence of evidence that a security agreement did, in fact, serve
such a notice function, courts make assumptions concerning how a
third person might react to it. In re Aragon Industries, Inc."' provides
a good example of the way in which such assumptions may be ques-
tionable.
In Aragon, a leasing company sought reclamation from the
debtor's bankruptcy estate of two forklift trucks. The "Equipment
Under the Code, an interested third party has the burden of continuing
his investigation as to prior perfected security interests which may affect
the proposed collateral for his particular agreement with the debtor. In
this sense, the financing statement's purpose is to merely alert the third
party as to the need for further investigation, never to provide a com-
prehensive data bank as to the details of prior security arrangements.
As a general rule, a financing description is sufficient if it describes the collateral in
such a manner that reasonable inquiry will disclose the complete state of affairs. Ray v.
City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 639 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Yancey Bros. Co. v.
Dehco, Inc.. 108 Ga. App. 875, 878, 134 S.E.2d 828, 831(1964)(relying on pre-Code law).
138 See, e.g., In re Munger, 495 F.2d 511, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1974). See text at notes
28-30, 34 & 44 supra.
1" See, e.g., River Oaks Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Barfield, 482 S.W.2d 925, 928
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Rusch Factors, Inc. v. PasspOrt Fashion, Ltd., 67 Misc. 2d 3, 7,
322 N.Y.S.2d 765, 768-69 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem., 38 App. Div. 2d 690, 327 N.Y.S.2d 536
(1971), appeal denied, 30 N.Y.2d 482, 280 N.E.2d 895, 330 N.Y.S.2d 1026 (1972).
'" The following cases are examples of the few opinions indicating that a third
party may have actually sought out and relied upon the contents of' a security agree-
ment: National Ropes, Inc. v. National Diving Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975);
J. K. Gill Co. v. Fireside Realty, Inc., 262 Ore. 486, 499 P.2d 813 (1972). One possible
reason for the small number of such cases is that if an interested third person actually
read a security agreement and was misled, it is less likely that the secured party would
be willing to litigate the adequacy of the security agreement. Often, it is a bankruptcy
trustee, representing persons who gave value to the debtor and for whom there is no
evidence of knowledge or concern about the possibility of being subject to a security in-
terest, who asserts that the security agreement description is inadequate because it might
somehow mislead third persons. See, e.g., DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir.
1969). The bankruptcy trustee can assert defenses of the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)
(1970). Thus, he can assert that the security agreement is not enforceable for lack of
compliance with the Article Nine formalities. Of course, the minimum mandatory lan-
guage required by § 9-203(1)(a) must be present even absent inspection of the security
agreement by a third party. See Leasing Serv. Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 19 UCC REP. SERV. 252, 262-63 (D.N.J. 1976). See note and text at note 152 infra.
1 " 14 UCC REP. Seim 1218 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
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Lease Agreement" 12 specified, under a "Description of Equipment"
heading, seven forklift trucks which were designated by model and
serial numbers. The financing statement, which was properly filed,
made reference to an attached copy of the lease. The two forklift
trucks for which reclamation was sought were of the same model
types as those described in the lease, but were not among those specif-
ically designated by serial number.'" Two other forklift trucks, which
had been on the bankrupt's premises at the time of its bankruptcy,
were among those specifically described in the lease and were turned
over to the leasing company. The evidence established that the leasing
company, as part of its original dealings with the bankrupt, made a
substitution for certain of the forklift trucks listed on the lease and
that the two forklift trucks for which reclamation was sought were, in
fact, among those delivered to the bankrupt in conjunction with the
lease transaction.
Though the opinion does not' suggest that any third partty actu-
ally checked the record or was in any way misled by the description
contained in the security agreement, the court adopted the perspec-
tive of a potential creditor considering the forklift trucks as collateral
for a loan. In so doing, it held that the description was not adequate.
The court reasoned that anyone inquiring would have found the
financing statement and would have been referred to the attached
equipment lease.' 44 The court then assumed that the third party
would go to the debtor's premises and would have found both the two
forklift trucks which were of the model types described, but which did
not bear any of the specifically described serial numbers, as well as the
two forklift trucks which were specifically described by serial numbers.
After acknowledging that there was no evidence regarding the cus-
toms or practices of commercial parties in this sort of situation, the
court weighed -
 two additional assumptions. It could find that the
hypothetical potential creditor would wonder whether the two unde-
scribed forklift trucks were in some way related to the transaction
represented by the equipment lease 145 or, it could find that the third
party would assume that they were not—that they were acquired as a
part of some other transaction, and that the five described forklift
trucks which were not on the debtor's premises had simply been dis-
'" It was conceded that the lease created a security interest arid was, thus, subject
to Article Nine. hi. at 1219. See UCC §§ 9-102(2), 1-201(37) and the text at notes 87-88
supra.
'4a
	 one model type, the serial numbers listed in the lease were 10669, 10739,
10676, 10836, 10824 and 10781. The truck claimed in the leasing company's petition
was serial number 11093. For the other model type, the serial number listed was 13114.
The truck claimed was serial number 13135. 14 UCC RET. SERV, at 1219. Thus, for both
trucks claimed, the serial numbers were not so Far removed from the serial numbers
described in the lease as to suggest that the trucks were obtained through an unrelated
transaction. The reasonable inference would be to the contrary.
144 Id. at 1221.
"5 Id. See note 147 infra.
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posed of.'" Since the two assumptions were equally plausible to the
court, it resolved the issue in favor of the hypothetical third party be-
cause it believed that the description had the potential to mislead and
prevent appropriate inquiry. 147
Although the court was willing to weigh heavily the interests of a
hypothetical third party, the opinion is devoid of facts which could
have helped to gauge his hypothetical response. For example, a third
party's response would be different depending upon whether the
forklift trucks were equipment or inventory.' 49
 One would suspect
that since the trucks were leased, the debtor obtained them for use as
equipment. If the trucks represented a significant portion of the
debtor's equipment, that five of them were missing from the debtor's
premises would insure that a third party, contemplating lending
against the forklift trucks, would be at least as concerned about the
status of the debtor's solvency as about the status of the nondescribed
forklift trucks.' 49 One must wonder whether a third party would rely
on any assumption rather than investigate further prior to giving
value on the security of the nonspecifically described forklift trucks. It
is more plausible that an investigation, or a final refusal to give value,
would be undertaken by the potential creditor than would an assump-
tion be made that the lessee is financially sound, or that the nonde-
scribed forklift trucks will never be claimed as security by the lessor.
Thus, the Aragon court evaluated the adequacy of the memorandum
relied upon by the secured party in light of unwarranted assumptions.
The court in Aragon was correct in determining that the writing
required by Article Nine as a precondition to the enforceability of a
security agreement can serve a notice function even though it is the
financing statement which was intended as the primary notice docu-
ment by the Code's draftsmen.' 9° If the writing contains an ambigu-
ous description or is otherwise in a form that reasonably and detri-
mentally misleads a third party, then the secured party, who would
normally have had a role in drafting the document, should be held to
the third party's interpretation.'" The absence of such misreliance
cannot be conclusive on the adequacy of a writing claimed to be a suf-
ficient section 9-203(1)(a) memorandum because this provision re-
quires a written agreement which "creates or provides" for a security
140 Id,
147 Id. The court said this situation was distinguishable from the one in which the
description contained model numbers only. The court would not concede the adequacy
of such a description, however. Id. at 1221. See note 157 infra.
' 'See UCC §§ 9-109(2), 9-109(4).
1411 The opinion does not indicate what happened to the five missing described
6.irklift trucks. The lessor may have previously repossessed them. Or, if the substitution
was not one-for-one, there may not have been seven forklift trucks to begin with. Or,
the lessee may have sold them out of trust. Or. ...
' 5° This function would be included within the evidentiary function of the writ-
ing requirement. See note and text at note 97 supra. Third parties can assert that a se-
curity interest is not enfoiceable. See note 57 SUP].
' 51 See text at notes 176-79 infra.
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interest and which "reasonably identifies what is described" regardless
of whether a third party actually consults the writing.'" In determin-
ing the adequacy of a security agreement under these requirements, it
is appropriate for a court to consider how a third party might react to
it. Such judicial inquiry should recognize that the description required
need not be autonomous nor evaluated without contextual references.
It need only "make possible the identification of the thing
described."'" Any assumption made concerning how a third party
might react should take into account the factual and commercial set-
ting in which he would encounter the writing; 154 the caution which
would be exercised by such a person deciding whether to give value to
be secured by property which might be subject to a prior claim by
some other person; and the various means of investigation available to
determine what assets are actually encumbered. The third person
hypothesized should be an individual of reasonable commercial pru-
dence and sophistication.'"
This perspective on the security agreement qua notice document
points the way to an appropriate general approach to the analysis of
security agreement language when a third person is involved. First, it
must be determined whether the language employed is adequate to
satisfy section 9-203(1)(a). The court in Aragon l" would have stood on
more solid ground if it had concluded merely that the security agree-
ment was not enforceable because it contained no description of
the two forklift trucks claimed by the secured party. Although the full
equipment lease agreement was not reproduced in the opinion, the
secured party's argument that the description employed was adequate
for the trucks claimed may have been akin to the argument, discussed
previously, that the words "one desk-top computer" adequately de-
scribed machine shop equiptnent. 157 Where the language employed
satisfies the section 9-203(1)(a) statute of frauds, it is appropriate to
proceed directly to determine the actual intent of the parties through
the process of interpretation. For example, in Mitchell v. Shephard Mall
State Bank,' 58 where the court barred extrinsic evidence in deciding
152 See note and text at note 140 supra,
353 See note 99 supra. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Conerty Pontiac—Buick,
Inc. 37 Misc, 2d 311, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 953 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
"'See, e.g., In re A Sc T Kwik-N-Handi, Inc. 12 UCC REP. SERV. 765 (M.D. Ga.
1973); In re Munger, 495 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1974). See notes and text at notes 80.82
supra.
1 " For example, unlike the third party in Middle Atlantic. See note and text at
note 28 supra.
15" 14 UCC REP. SERV. 1218 (S.D. Fla. 1973). See text at notes 141.49 supra.
157 See notes and text at note 111  supra. The title or heading "Equipment" in the
lease could not provide the minimum evidence and assurances required by § 9-203 for
equipment not itemized because of the itemization. However, the statute would have
been satisfied if this title or heading were followed by language such as "all equipment";
"forklift truck, model types A and B"; or "forklift trucks including but not limited to
trucks with serial numbers x and y."
35° 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972). See notes and text at notes 37-49 supra.
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whether a security interest existed in inventory, accounts receivable
and contract rights, the intent of the parties should have been control-
ling, as the security agreement language provided the minimum evi-
dence and protection for a security interest required by section
9-203(1)(a). Whether a security interest was actually intended in such
collateral was certainly an open question under the writings presented
to the Mitchell court.'" In the absence of reliance by the third person
on a reasonable but erroneous belief as to what the immediate parties
intended in their agreement, the intent of the immediate parties
should be ascertained and should then be binding on the third
person.'" Assuming that the parol evidence rule can be raised by or
against a person not a party to the agreement,"' it should not operate
to exclude extrinsic, interpretive evidence to any greater extent than
when the immediate parties are involved in the litigation.' 02 Once the
intended scope of the security interest has been determined, the court
may finally proceed to apply the appropriate rule to determine
whether it is the secured party or the third party that has the better
rights in the collateral.
2. Other Purposes
Just as the protection of third parties does not require security
agreement language in addition to that required by the minimum evi-
dence and minimum protection function of section 9-203(1)(a),
neither do the other purposes which might be read into the writing
requirement. One such additional purpose for requiring a writing
would be to insure that persons who are about to create a security in-
terest in their assets sufficiently contemplate that act and its conse-
quences. Such a purpose could provide a reason for requiring the use
of specific granting language likely to caution a potential grantor that
he is transferring something of value to another person. This purpose
might also militate in favor of a higher degree of specificity in the de-
scription of the collateral when a consumer, rather than some more
commercially knowledgeable person, is to be the debtor. 163 However,
"'See 458 F.2d at 702.
15 " See In re Thompson, 8 UCC REF. State. 1407 (W.D. Wis. 1971). UCC § 1-103
permits a court to supplement the provisions of the UCC with the principles of law and
equity.
" 1 See generally Note, 41 FukiniAm L. REV. 945, 959-68 (1973).
342 See note and text at note 110 supra.
I" Colorado's nonuniform version of UCC § 9-110 requires a more specific de-
scription when the collateral consists of consumer goods. COL. Rev. STAT. § 9-110 (1973)
provides:
For the purposes of this article, any description of personal property is
sufficient if it specifically identifies and itemizes in the security agreement
what is described as to consumer goods, and whether or not it is specific if
it reasonably identifies what is described as to all other personal property.
Some courts have exhibited hostility toward broad security agreement descriptions
when the debtor is a consumer. Burke, Secured Transactions, 30 Bus, LAW, 893, 900
(1975).
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there is no mention of such a cautionary function for the protection
of any class of debtors anywhere in Article Nine.'" Its draftsmen in-
corporated, but then ultimately abandoned, such consumer protective
requirements.' 65 In addition, state and federal consumer credit
legislation 166 will normally apply to require clear and conspicuous dis-
closure of security interests and related information to consutners.' 87
Another purpose which might be read into Article Nine's writing
requirement is that it is intended or should be applied to prevent the
"monopolization" of the debtor's personalty.' 68 The general criticism
of Article Nine on these grounds is based on two related notions:
first, once a creditor has taken a properly perfected security interest
in the debtor's present and future assets of a certain description,
other potential creditors are foreclosed from being secured with first
priority in these assets, and as a result, they may not be willing to give
value to the debtor; second, the secured creditor with first priority
may successfully reclaim all assets fitting the description in the event
of bankruptcy, leaving other persons with legitimate but lower priority
claims empty handed.'" Prejudice against "monopolization" was very
strong prior to the enactment of Article Nine,'" and it is possible that
opinions in which a security agreement is found to fail because of an
inadequate description may in part reflect an application of this
prejudice.'" It is not a new notion that cases ostensibly holding an
"" The lack of consumer protection under Article Nine is treated at D.
RtYritscint.t) & D. CARROLL, CONSUMER PROTECHON: TENT & MATERIALS § 18.05 (Stu-
dent ed. 1973).
LOS For example, UCC § 7-611(1) (May 1949 Draft version) included a require-
ment that the consumer receive a copy of the security agreement which conspicuously
indicated that his goods could be repossessed.
"6 E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1637(a)(7), 1638(a)(10), & 1639(a)(8) (1970); Mass. Gen. L.
ch. 140c, §§ 1-13; Kr. RE).', STAT, § 371.210. See e.g. Tinsman v. Moline Benet'. Gin. Co.,
531 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1976); in re Bengston, 3 UCC REP. SERV. 283 (D. Conn. 1975).
167 The doctrine of uticonscionability provides a means by which a court can
police unreasonably broad descriptions of collateral in security agreements executed by
consumers with little bargaining power. See UCC §§ 1-103, 2-302; William v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
l" See Comment, 48 DEN. L. j. 146, 152-53 (1971),
's 0 See Hogan, Future Goods, Floating Liens, and Foolish Creditors, 17 STAN, L. REV.
822, 822-23 (1965).
"° The history of personal property security law has been described as a "pro-
tracted guerrilla war" Finally won by the guerrillas with the enactment of Article Nine.
Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism and Article 9, 47 NEts. L. REv. 659, 659-60 (1968). The
judiciary, long the leader of the anti-personal property security forces, id. at 659, may
he the new guerrillas.
'" For example, in In re Middle Atlantic Stud Welding Co., 503 F.2d at 1136, the
court used the pre-Code prejudice against monopolization to support its holding that a
description of collateral was insufficient.. See text at notes 24-30 supra. It is no secret
that a broad description of collateral in a security agreement may constitute an invita-
tion for a court to reach an "equitable" solution to conflicting clahns in collateral
through ascertaining the "intent" of the parties. For example, in Goodall Rubber Co. v.
Mews Ready Mix Corp., 7 UCC REP. SEkv. 1358, 1361 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1970) the court
stated:
From the court's reading of the cases, one can establish the rationale that
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agreement unenforceable on the grounds of noncompliance with a
statute of frauds may actually be the result of some other factor.'"
Many of the formality cases have been decided in the context of a
bankruptcy proceeding in which a first priority security interest has
the most dramatic impact on lower priority interests. However, Article
Nine should be read as a legislative judgment that "monopolization" is
permissible as a matter of state law. Since bankruptcy trustees are
provided with a variety of weapons to use against secured creditors
under federal law, 17 " there would appear to be little room for the op-
eration of this prejudice in bankruptcy cases. Furthermore, a person
who sells additional personalty to the debtor, or who gives value for
the acquisition of such personalty, may qualify under Article Nine for
a special purchase money priority over prior secured parties who
might claim the additional personalty under an after-acquired prop-
erty clause.' 74
Still another purpose which may be read into Article Nine's writ-
ing requirements is that it is designed to promote careful drafting and
clarification of the relationship between the parties to a security
agreement. In Mitchell v. Shephard Mall State Bank, "5 this rationale was
voiced in terms of construing the security agreement against the party
who drafted it. " 6 Under certain circumstances, it is appropriate for a
court to accept the interpretation of contractual language offered by
the party who did not draft the language.'" This principle of contract
interpretation is based on a policy of favoring the party to a form agree-
where subsequent creditors have made specific and substantial personal
property available to the debtor, the courts are less ready to find that a
prior creditor's description of the collateral "reasonably identifies" the
after-acquired property to the prejudice of the hapless subsequent creditor.
While this offers no standard of construction, it does offer an expla nation
(emphasis in original).
Accord, e.g., Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26, 28-29 (Ky.
1968).
"2 See generally 2 CoRaiN,supra note 57, 275, at 11-12.
"3 See generally UCC HAto)000K,supra note 71, HI 24-1 through 24-10.
"4 See UCC §1 9-107, 9-312(3), 9-312(4); T.M. Cobb Co. v. County of Los
Angeles, — Cal. 3d —, —, 128 Cal. Rptr. 655, 664, 547 P.2d 431, 440 (1976).
Any seller or lender, regardless of whether he qualifies for a purchase money priority,
is free to pay off prior secured parties to obtain priority, or to attempt to obtain an
agreement in which prior parties subordinate their rights. See UCC § 9-316.
15
 458 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972). See text at notes 37-49 supra.
"5 Id. at 704:
If the instrument be ambiguous the Bank and SBA made it so, they
should not now be permitted to explain what is implicit in that which they
failed to make explicit in the critical terms of the security agreement. The
Code's requirements for the creation of security interests are simple and
clearly set forth. Where forms to facilitate compliance with these require-
ments have been provided, the secured party ought to be able to fill in the
blanks so as to avoid ambiguity with regard to the security interest
granted.
'" See generally 3 Coanini.supra note 57, § 559, at 262.
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ment who had the weaker bargaining position.'" It is also based
on the assumption that the drafter of the contract is more likely to
provide for his own interests at the expense of the other party and to
know of, and perhaps even provide for, obscurities in meaning.'"
While these rationales may provide a valid means for clearing away an
alternative, reasonable interpretation offered by a party to an agree-
ment, they do not in themselves justify a strict interpretation of the
Article Nine formalities. In the interpretation of the Code, the crucial
factor should be the statutory language itself and the intent of the
draftsmen. The intent of the draftsmen generally under Article Nine
was to facilitate the intent of the immediate parties, given the
minimum debtor-authenticated writing.'" A writing requirement may
serve to promote good draftsmanship and clarification of legal
relationships; 181 however, it can serve these functions, at best, in a
very incidental manner."' It is submitted that pragmatic considera-
tions, such as avoiding litigation and avoiding an adverse judicial in-
terpretation, do a better job of insuring that the parties will draw se-
curity agreements with a reasonable degree of care and accuracy.
Moreover, courts should, particularly when they are dealing with a
security agreement entered into by laymen without assistance of
counsel,' 83 be aware that the draftsmen of Article Nine intended a
general simplification of security law. As Professor Gilmore has stated
in describing the intent of the draftsmen: "Security law should cease
to be a paradise for specialists and should become a playground for
all the people—small town practitioners, county bankers, even widows
and orphans. Taking a personal property security interest should be
made as simple and easy as rolling off a log."'"
III. CONCLUSION
For a writing to rise to the level of an enforceable Article Nine
security agreement under section 9-203(I)(a), it must be signed by the
debtor and provide minimum written assurances that a security in-
"s Id. at 266-68.
'" RESTATEMENT (SF:CON/D) OF CONTRACTS § 232 & comment at. 526 (Tent. Drafts
Nos. 1-7, 1973).
"° See text at notes 183-84 infra.
181 Friedman, Law, Rules, and the Interpretation of Written Documents, 59 Nw. U. L.
Rnv. 751, 762.63 (1965).
"'See Perillo, supra note 57, at 56-58.
183 Some courts have not been sympathetic to the fact that a layman attempted to
formalize a security relationship. E.g., First County Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Canna,
124 N.J. Super. 154, 156.59, 305 A.2d 442, 443.45 (App. Div, 1973) (per curiam). Other
courts have been charitable when dealing with a financial institution that has performed
slipshod work in formalizing a security interest. In re Penn Housing Corp., 367 F.
Supp. 661, 665 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
'" Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism and Article 9, 47 NE:B. L. REA/. 659, 668 (1968).
The draftsmen's premise that security law should be simplified went beyond the elimi-
nation of unnecessary formalism with respect to the written security agreement. See id.
at 671-75.
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terest was intended and minimum protection against mistaken or
fraudulent claims of secured status. Many sorts of writings satisfy
these requirements including those which, though lacking express
granting language, refer to a possible security agreement, security in-
terest, or secured status. Any security agreement description of collat-
eral which is broad enough to include the personalty claimed by the
alleged secured party should be sufficient. Considerations of third
party protection, consumer protection, prevention of monopolization
of debtor's assets, and clarification of commercial relationships do not
mandate additional or more specific language for the minimum
memoranda required. Once a court determines that a section
9-203(1)(a) memorandum is present, it should permit the introduction
of extrinsic evidence in aid of interpreting the writing's meaning. This
approach to section 9-203(1)(a) and the interpretation of security
agreement language insures the maximum possible facilitation of in-
tent to create enforceable security interests under Article Nine.
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